Red Kite

Dead man’s switch monitoring · servers, NAS and PCs

The alarm is the absence of a message, not the presence of one.

Every few minutes, each machine you look after says “I am still here” to a hub outside its building. Red Kite watches for the message that does not arrive — and tells a person, in a sentence, within minutes.

£129 once · unlimited machines · you host it · no subscription

Nothing to open on your firewall. No VPN, no port forwarding, no static IP. A server in a cupboard behind a domestic router is as watchable as one in a data centre.

Silence clock · example fleet time ×40
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m ANSWERING 12 of 14 machines

answering late past 5m silent past 15m

A machine that has just reported sits at the start of the scale and drifts clockwise as it goes quiet. A tick crossing a mark is a machine changing state — visibly, in the direction of trouble.

Barton Seagrave server is late — nothing for 12:34, but it is still inside its grace period, so nothing has been raised.

Text message · 04:27

Red Kite: we have not heard from Barton Seagrave server since 04:12. Nothing has arrived for 15 minutes.

Push · 04:41

Red Kite: Barton Seagrave server is answering again. It was quiet for 29 minutes.

Email · 07:00 daily

Red Kite: all 14 machines answered overnight. Nothing outstanding.

The gap

Three disasters that look identical from inside the building. And a fourth nobody plans for.

A monitor that lives on the same site, on the same power, behind the same broadband, cannot report its own absence. It goes quiet at exactly the moment you need it, and silence from a monitor reads like a quiet night.

Boxing Day, 03:40

The power went off

The machine is fine. It is simply not running, and it will not be running until somebody walks into a closed building and presses a button.

Any Tuesday

The broadband went down

Everything on site is healthy and nothing on site can tell anybody. The router dialling home is the router that stopped.

The August fortnight

The building is shut

An office closed for two weeks with a server quietly dead in a cupboard is the classic. It is discovered on the first morning back.

The one nobody plans for

The monitor itself died

No alerts is what a dead monitor and a good week both look like. That ambiguity is what quietly kills systems like this — so we answer it three ways.

A monitor that must reach in reports “all well” when its own network breaks. This one reports trouble when anything between the machine and the hub breaks — which is the honest answer, because if we cannot hear from it, we do not know that it is well.

The inversion

Machines reach out. We never reach in.

This single decision is why Red Kite works in places ordinary monitoring cannot go — and it is a decision we will not trade away later for convenience.

Customer site Somewhere else entirely Server or NAS + redkite-agent.sh, on a systemd timer Office PC or Windows server + redkite-agent.ps1, on a scheduled task The hub records every check-in, on its own clock sweeps every minute for overdue machines opens one incident, and only one email · SMS · push Outbound HTTPS only “I am still here” — every five minutes Never · nothing connects in
The hub holds no address for your machines, because it has no use for one. There is no field for an IP address, an SSH port or a management URL — storing one would be the first step towards dialling it.

Ordinary monitoring polls: it sits somewhere and connects to each machine to ask how it is. That needs a route in — a port forwarded, a VPN, an agent listening on something. At eighty customer sites behind eighty domestic-grade routers, that is eighty negotiations, eighty firewall rules and eighty things that can be got wrong.

Red Kite inverts it. The machine makes one outbound HTTPS request every few minutes, the way it already reaches every website and update server it uses. Nothing is exposed, nothing is forwarded, and there is no new attack surface at the customer’s edge — because there is nothing new listening.

It also means we are honest about the limit this buys. We cannot tell “the machine is off” from “the broadband is down” — and we do not pretend to. We say what we know: we have not heard from this since 04:12.

  • Works behind NAT, CG-NAT and a dynamic IP
  • Works through a corporate proxy
  • Survives a customer changing ISP without anybody telling you
  • One outbound rule, port 443, which every site already permits
  • No inbound firewall rule
  • No VPN or tunnel to maintain
  • No port forwarding, no exposed management port
  • No SNMP, SSH, WinRM or WMI from the hub to a monitored machine — ever

The screens

One screen, left open on a second monitor.

Worst first, always. The sentence across the top is the product; the figures underneath support it. This is the Now screen, drawn with the hub’s own components and an example fleet of fourteen machines.

hub.redkite.info
RED KITE hub.redkite.info
Now Incidents The hub Add machine
Time now 04:41:07
Last asked the hub 3s ago
The sweep 41s ago
Watching the watcher pinged 2m ago
Alerts 6 sent, 0 failed

We have not heard from Barton Seagrave server since 04:12 this morning.

10 answering. 2 silent, 1 late but inside grace, 1 never heard from.

The fleet — worst first 14 machines
Barton Seagrave server Fielding & Co · Barton Seagrave 29m Silent 98.41% up
Weekley PC Weldon Plant Hire · Weekley 18m Silent 99.62% up
Burton Latimer server Brayfield Joinery · Burton Latimer 7m Late 99.98% up
Corby office PC Corby Signs · Corby never Not heard from
Kettering NAS Easy2pc · Kettering 2m Answering 99.87% up
Desborough NAS Fielding & Co · Desborough 3m Answering 100.00% up
Rothwell server Brayfield Joinery · Rothwell 1m Answering 99.99% up
Easy2pc server Easy2pc · Kettering 43s Answering 100.00% up
Wellingborough server Weldon Plant Hire · Wellingborough 2m Answering 99.94% up
Silence clock — time since last heartbeat 20 min window
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m ANSWERING 10 of 14 machines

Every tick is a machine, placed by how long it has been quiet.

Silent 2 Late 1 Not heard from 1 Muted 0 Answering 10
Open incidents 2 open

We have not heard from Barton Seagrave server since 04:12 this morning.

opened 04:27 this morningcriticalnot acknowledged
Acknowledge

We have not heard from Weekley PC since 04:23 this morning.

opened 04:38 this morningwarningacknowledged by Adrian
The hub itself watching itself
Opened last sweep
1
Closed last sweep
0
Check-ins stored
412,908
Machines watched
14

Example figures on an example fleet. The machine names, customers and times are made up; the layout, the components and the wording are the hub’s own.

Every colour has a shape

You can read it with any kind of colour vision

Silent is a diamond, late is a triangle, answering is a circle, and never-heard-from is a hollow square. Red and green are exactly the pair colour blindness destroys, and this screen may hang on a wall — so identity never rests on hue alone.

One badge per kind of trouble

Two problems for two different afternoons

“This server is unwell” is the beginning of a question, and a single worst-of badge asks somebody to open the machine to answer it. “Its disks and its backup are unwell, and its services are fine” is the beginning of a decision. So each part of a machine gets its own mark, with a count where there is more than one.

Grey is never a pass

A machine we have never heard from is as loud as a dead one

A machine we have never heard from gets the same visual weight as one that has stopped — a different colour, the same insistence. It is not a faint tick waiting to go green. We cannot tell whether it is well, and the screen says so.

The second job

“Alive” and “well” are different questions.

A server with a failed mirror leg, a filesystem quietly remounted read-only and four hundred corrected memory errors answers every heartbeat perfectly — right up until the morning it does not answer at all. These are the failures that present fine in the foreground and kill the machine in the background.

A filesystem that remounted read-only

When ext4 hits an I/O error it remounts read-only to protect what is left. Everything already running carries on from memory. Nothing crashes. The site still serves.

Why nothing else sees it: every write silently fails until somebody reboots days later and finds that the last week does not exist. A machine in this state passes every heartbeat check ever written, including ours.

A mirror running on one leg

The quietest catastrophe there is. A RAID 1 with one disk gone serves every read perfectly and gives no sign at all from the foreground.

Why nothing else sees it: the machine is fine until the surviving disk goes, and then there is nothing. We read mdadm and ZFS state, rebuild progress, and the mismatch count — which on RAID 1 is silent corruption nothing else mentions.

Memory correcting errors it never mentions

A DIMM correcting single-bit errors is doing its job and telling nobody. We read the EDAC counters on Linux and WHEA events on Windows.

Why it matters: a module that has thrown one correctable error is far likelier than average to throw an uncorrectable one — and that is a machine that stops dead in the night with no explanation attached.

A thin pool quietly filling up

An LVM thin pool that reaches 100% does not return an error politely. It wedges every filesystem sitting on it, at once.

Why nothing else sees it: not a single disk is full. Every tool that measures free space says the machine is fine, right up to the moment everything stops.

The backup that has been failing since March

A backup is judged on when it last succeeded, never on what the last run said. Failed systemd units are reported by name — “one unit failed” is not actionable; borgbackup.service is.

Why nothing else sees it: a backup failing quietly is only ever discovered on the day it is needed.

A disk that pauses for eight seconds

Windows disk events 129 and 153 are a controller resetting a device that stopped answering, and a retried read. On Linux, the SMART command-timeout and pending-sector counts say the same thing.

Why nothing else sees it: logged as warnings, surfaced by nothing. The machine is perfectly usable for months. It just occasionally stops, and nobody can say why.

Inodes gone, with 400 GB free

A filesystem can run out of inodes while reporting hundreds of gigabytes available. It is full. Nothing can be written.

Why nothing else sees it: every tool that measures free space in bytes says it is fine, because in bytes it is.

A reboot the machine is still waiting for

A kernel security update installed six weeks ago on a machine nobody has restarted is not installed. We also derive unplanned restarts from uptime going down between two check-ins.

Why nothing else sees it: the update counter reports zero outstanding, which reads as fully patched and is not. Nothing anywhere records a reboot.

The full inventory of what we watch

The principle behind the figures

Deltas, not levels.

A drive with twenty-four reallocated sectors that has had twenty-four for three years is a scar. The same twenty-four appearing this week is a drive coming apart. Same number. Opposite meanings. Only a comparison tells them apart.

Every counter rule compares the newest check-in against one from seven days ago, and says on screen which of the three cases it is looking at: rising, steady, or not yet knowable.

The same reasoning runs through the space rules. A disk at 82% is not interesting. A disk at 82% that was at 61% last week runs out a week on Thursday — and that is a date somebody can put in a diary and a job somebody can quote for.

We take the raw SMART value, never the vendor’s normalised one. Vendors disagree about what “100” means; only the raw count can be compared against last week’s.

The rule we will not bend

Unknown is never good news.

A monitoring system that renders “cannot tell” as “fine” is worse than having none at all, because it is believed. Wherever a reading is missing, stale or unreachable, we say so — in its own colour, with words beside it.

Rothwell server

41% free, and steady for a month.

Kettering NAS

Nearly full — 3% free, and backups stop when it fills.

Corby office PC

We cannot read this disk, so we cannot say whether it is well.

That third card is the whole rule. An empty ring resting at zero and a healthy zero are the same picture, and the difference between them is “we cannot see the disk” against “the disk is fine”. So the unknown state is drawn differently, and the words are written next to it.

The same applies everywhere else: a machine that has never checked in is grey with an explanation, not green. A machine whose last check-in is stale is amber or red on the strength of that staleness alone, because the figures inside a stale check-in describe the past. And a snapshot older than two hours is discarded rather than sent — vanishing is honest; freezing at last week’s values is the exact lie this product exists to catch.

The loop, precisely

Six steps, and nothing hidden in them.

The agent wakes on a timer

It gathers its figures — every one a cheap read of /proc, df or the Windows equivalent — and posts them to the hub with its own token. No disk scans, no database queries, no process trees.

The hub records it, on the hub’s clock

Machines have wrong clocks — across eighty of them there are always some. The agent’s own clock travels as a fact, so we can tell you a machine is 41 minutes behind — but it is never the basis of a decision.

A sweep runs every minute

It finds every check whose last check-in is older than its interval plus its grace period. One query on an indexed timestamp, which is simple enough to reason about at three in the morning — and which catches up correctly if the hub itself was off for an hour.

One incident opens. Exactly one

Not one message per sweep. An incident opens once, notifies once, and escalates on a schedule. Fifty texts about one dead server is how somebody ends up blocking the number.

The people who need it are told

On every channel they have chosen for that severity. Unacknowledged after a set time, it escalates — the next person, a louder channel, or both. Acknowledging stops the ladder, and needs no sign-in.

When it comes back, it closes itself

The commonest ending is the machine returning on its own, and a resolution message goes out on the same channels as the alarm. Leaving people to tidy up stale incidents by hand is how the list stops being believed.

Getting the message through

A grid, not a switch.

Alerts go by every channel a person chooses, per severity. Not one channel configured globally for everybody. The standard is “no excuse to miss all three”.

One person’s choices — the director on call
ChannelInfoWarningCritical
PushYesYesYes
EmailYesYes
Text messageYes
Quiet hours22:00–07:00, overridden for critical only

Quiet hours have a per-severity override. Critical still wakes you at two in the morning; a disk at 82% waits until breakfast. An engineer who looks after four accounts is not woken for the other seventy-six.

Not sending is a failure, and it is recorded as one. Every attempt is stored with its outcome and the provider’s own reference. If a channel fails, the next is tried; if all of them fail, that itself becomes an incident. A monitoring system that cannot prove it sent the message has not sent it.

Email goes through a transactional provider with SPF, DKIM and DMARC set properly — not a mail relay with its own silent failure modes. The wrong dependency for the thing that tells you about failures is another thing that fails quietly.

The hardest problem here

If the monitor dies, no alerts fire. But no alerts is also what a good week looks like.

Silence is ambiguous, and it is ambiguous in the worst possible direction. Three answers, all cheap, all used together.

Every morning, 07:00

A digest that arrives whether or not anything is wrong

“All 43 machines answered overnight. Nothing outstanding.” The value is not the content — it is that its absence is noticeable. A human who does not get their seven o’clock message knows something is wrong with the monitor itself.

Every five minutes

An external dead man’s switch

The hub pings a third-party service that nobody here controls — a free Healthchecks.io check or similar. If the hub dies, that service sends the email. Nothing should mark its own homework, and the ping is deliberately withheld whenever the sweep is not genuinely running, which is the failure that actually matters.

On the same screen as yours

The hub watches itself as a machine

Its own disk, memory and database go through the same checks and the same thresholds as anything else, and appear in the same list. It is a server too, and it is not exempt from its own rules.

What goes on your machines

The most boring software in the building.

It runs unattended on somebody else’s server for years. It must never fill a disk, never hang, never wedge a machine and never need attention. Everything about its design follows from that.

A check-in, in full

// figures, never content — see the privacy note below
{
  "sentAt": "2026-09-08T14:05:00Z",   // a fact, never a basis
  "agentVersion": "1.0.0",
  "uptimeSeconds": 862134,
  "os": "Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS",
  "disks": [ { "mount": "/",
                "totalBytes": 487880318976,
                "freeBytes": 357411692544 } ],
  "memory": { "totalBytes": 8232421376,
               "availableBytes": 5911236608 },
  "load": [ 0.05, 0.02, 0.00 ],
  "services": [ { "name": "docker", "running": true } ],
  "backup": { "lastSucceededAt": "2026-09-08T01:09:31Z",
               "outcome": "ok" }
}

Installing it

# Linux — the token is baked in by the hub
curl -fsSL https://hub.redkite.info/install.sh \
  | sudo bash -s -- --token rk_live_9f3a…

# The manual steps are published too, because piping a
# script into sudo bash is exactly what we would tell you
# never to do. It is short enough to read in full first.
  • A shell script on Linux, PowerShell on Windows. No compiled binary, no runtime to install, no new language on your server
  • Readable by any engineer and auditable by a suspicious customer. That is a feature, not an accident
  • Fire and forget, ten-second timeout. It never blocks, never retries in a tight loop, never queues
  • One log file with a hard size cap. An agent that fills /var/log has caused the very outage it was installed to report
  • It never gains privilege. The readings that need root are taken by a separate unit that cannot speak to the network at all. No sudoers line, no setuid bit
  • Failing to reach us is normal and silent. The internet being down is our problem to notice, not the agent’s to complain about

A machine that can only manage “I am alive” is still worth watching. Every figure is optional — an agent that refuses to report because it cannot read one of them is an agent that reports nothing.

The line we will not cross

The agent sends. It does not receive instructions.

This is the most important decision in the whole product, and the one we are most often asked to bend. The reasoning is arithmetic rather than caution: an agent that can be told what to run turns one compromised hub into administrative access to every customer site at once. That is not a monitoring system. It is a botnet with a support contract.

What the hub’s reply to a check-in may and may not contain
The reply may carryBecause the agentAllowed
A suggested interval, in secondswrites it to a config value, as a bounded integerYes
A replacement tokenwrites it to a config file, after checking its prefix and character setYes
A URL to fetchwould have to go and get somethingNo
A script, command, path or package versionwould have to run somethingNo
A flag changing which figures are gatheredwould be taking its behaviour from the networkNo

The test is simple: could a malicious reply from the hub cause the agent to execute code, read a file it does not already read, or contact a host other than the one in its local configuration? An integer and an opaque credential fail that test safely. Anything with a scheme, a slash or a shell metacharacter in it does not.

There is no auto-update either. A bad update lands on every machine simultaneously, and the agent’s entire value is that it is dull and always works. Updates are deliberate, staged, and pushed by an engineer.

Somebody will ask for remote access, and it is a genuinely useful feature. The answer is that it belongs in a separate tool with its own authentication, its own audit trail and its own explicit consent — not bolted onto the one piece of software allowed to run unattended on every machine you own.

A check-in carries figures, never content

  • No file names, user names or process command lines
  • No kernel or event log messages — only how many there were
  • No drive serial numbers. They identify an asset and nothing here needs one
  • No network traffic figures. How much data you move is your business

Anything proposed for the payload is judged by one question: if this database leaked, what would the customer mind? Tokens are one per machine, hashed at rest, prefixed rk_live_ so one found in a log is recognisable, revocable without a site visit, and compared in fixed time.

Read the full security position

Said here for the same reason it is said on screen

What we still cannot see.

Every monitoring product has blind spots. With most of them, you find out about theirs from a customer. Here are ours, in writing, before you buy anything.

Blind spot

Hardware RAID controllers

PERC, SmartArray and LSI each need their own vendor tool, none of which can be assumed present and none of which this agent will shell out to. Where one is in use, the hub reports the blind spot rather than an absent array.

Blind spot

Disks a controller hides, and disks on a VM

If the host owns the disk, the guest cannot see its health. We say so on the machine rather than leaving a gap that reads like a clean bill.

Blind spot

Machines without smartmontools

The installer says so at install time, and the hub keeps saying so afterwards until somebody fixes it.

Out of scope, deliberately

Whether your application is doing its job

Is the website returning the right content, is the query slow — a different product, done well by other tools. Red Kite watches the machine underneath it. We also do not collect logs, and we do not poll switches by SNMP — because SNMP has to poll inwards, which is the one thing this design exists to avoid.

Licensing

You buy it. You own it.

No subscription. No renewal date. No per-agent fee, no sensors to count, and nobody to keep paying for the right to go on watching your own machines. Red Kite is a perpetual licence for software you install and run yourself.

£129 once · not per year

One payment, one licence, however many machines you end up watching.

  • Unlimited machines, for ever. Servers, NAS boxes, office PCs. Adding one is issuing a token, and that never costs anything.
  • Both agents included. Linux and Windows, with the installers and the privileged probe.
  • Twelve months of updates. Everything released in your first year, including the work listed under active development.
  • Yours after that, whatever you decide. The software never stops and never phones home. Another twelve months of updates is £69 if you want it, and nothing goes wrong if you do not.

Priced in pounds, paid once. There is no licence server, no activation call and no account with us — if we disappeared tomorrow, your hub would carry on watching your machines exactly as it does today. To buy one, write to us and we will raise an invoicecontact@redkite.info.

£0

Per agent, for ever

Watch one machine or eight hundred; the licence does not change. No endpoints to true up at renewal, no sensors to count, and no reason to leave a machine unwatched because adding it costs money.

Yours

Your hub, your database

We do not monitor it for you. There is no account with us, no dashboard of ours holding your customers’ figures, and no third party to notify if you leave. The data is in a PostgreSQL database you can back up, read and take away.

You

You decide when it changes

Nothing updates itself — not the agent, not the hub. A version that works is allowed to go on working. New releases are yours to install when it suits you, not pushed to eighty machines on our schedule.

How everyone else charges for this

Sold as What that means in practice Typical
Per endpoint, per month The bill grows with every machine you add, and is renegotiated at renewal $1.50–6.00 a device
Per technician You pay for engineers rather than machines — painful for a small team $129–249 each
Per sensor, per month You count sensors, and buy more of them when a server gains a disk from $200 / 500 sensors
Per host, per month Cheaper per machine at scale, still a bill that never stops ~$225 / 100 hosts
Red Kite Bought once, installed by you, unlimited machines £129, once

Indicative list prices published by other vendors, checked September 2026. They change, and every one of them is negotiable at volume — the point is the shape of the bill, not the number. Worth knowing that the sensor-priced option abandoned perpetual licensing in 2024 in favour of an annual subscription: what is on this page is the thing the rest of the market has been moving away from, which is either a warning or the reason you are reading it.

What that means against a monthly bill

The larger your fleet, the faster this stops being a comparison and starts being an embarrassment. A per-device contract charges you more for watching more machines; Red Kite charges you nothing for it.

A per-device contract at £4 a device a month, against one payment of £129
Fleet Per device, per year Red Kite Paid for itself in Over three years
5 machines £240 £129 under 7 months £720 → £129
20 machines £960 £129 about 7 weeks £2,880 → £129
80 machines £3,840 £129 about 12 days £11,520 → £129

£4 a device a month is a mid-range figure for a small fleet — published per-device list prices run from roughly $1.50 at ten-thousand-endpoint volumes up to $6 for a shop with fewer than fifty devices. Put your own bill in and the arithmetic only improves. Hosting is extra either way, and for Red Kite that is £6 to £20 a month paid to a hosting company rather than to us.

Where to put the hub

In the cloud, almost always.

You can install Red Kite anywhere that runs Docker: a machine in your own rack, or a five-pound virtual server somewhere else entirely. Both work. They are not equally good ideas, and it would be dishonest to pretend otherwise.

Recommended

A small cloud server

The hub has to be outside the building. That is the entire premise of the product. A hub in your own server room shares the power, the broadband and the roof with the machines it is watching — so on the morning that actually matters, the monitor dies alongside them, and silence from a dead monitor looks exactly like a quiet night.

It also keeps the exposure off your network. Agents must be able to reach the hub, which means the hub is reachable from the internet. Host it internally and you are publishing a service from inside your own perimeter, with a route from that service to everything else on the LAN. Host it on its own small server elsewhere and the worst case is contained: it holds figures, and it holds no route back into any of your sites.

It is still yours. Your virtual machine, your database, your backups. Cloud here means “somewhere that is not your building” — not “somebody else’s service”.

Supported

Your own server room

Sometimes it is the only option — a policy that forbids outside hosting, a regulator who says so, or a site with no usable outbound route. It works, and we will help you do it.

Go in with both costs understood. You take on the shared failure domain, and you take on publishing an inbound service from your own network. If you must, put the hub in a DMZ with no path back to the LAN, on its own power and ideally its own line.

It is a much better fit for watching machines at other sites than for watching the ones in the same room. A hub in your Kettering rack is an excellent way to watch twenty customer servers across the county. It is a poor way to watch the server standing next to it.

What it costs to run

Whatever the licence, this is the bill you carry afterwards — and it goes to a hosting company, not to us. Eighty machines checking in every five minutes is about 23,000 rows a day, which is trivial for PostgreSQL on the smallest server you can rent.

The cost driver is not scale, it is text messages during a bad week. Push notifications are effectively free and are the right default for almost everything; keep SMS for critical and the bill stays in pennies.

Running a hub, per month
Small VPS (2 vCPU, 4 GB)£4–6
Domain~£1
TLS certificateFree
Transactional email£0–12
Push notifications~£4 once
Text messages2–4p each
External dead man’s switchFree
All in~£6–20

Active development

Still being built, and we would rather say so.

Red Kite is worked on continuously. Owning a licence includes what comes next: new versions are yours to install when they suit you. Here is what is working today, what is being built, and what will never be built on purpose.

Working today

  • The dead man’s switchHeartbeats, the sweep, one incident per silence, and automatic closure when a machine returns.
  • The Linux agentShell script and systemd timer, with the unprivileged split for deep readings.
  • The Windows agentPowerShell and a scheduled task, running as SYSTEM.
  • Deep health on screenDisks, arrays, filesystems, memory, pressure, failed units — shown per machine, with a badge per kind of trouble.
  • AlertingEmail, SMS and push per person per severity, with quiet hours, escalation and acknowledgement.
  • The daily digestThe message whose absence is the point.
  • Watching the watcherThe hub monitors itself, and an outside service monitors the hub.

Being built

  • Figures raising their own incidentsToday the deep readings are shown and ranked on screen; next they get their own thresholds, so a failing disk wakes somebody the way silence already does.
  • Per-customer screens and routingThe tenancy filter is in the database from the first migration and every query already obeys it. What comes next is the screens, and alert routing by customer.
  • Graphs, trends and historyHourly roll-up and retention, so “82% and climbing” is a line rather than a sentence.
  • Rate limits and token rotationPer-token limits and rotation without an engineer visit.

Never, deliberately

  • Remote command executionThe one that gets asked for most. It belongs in a separate tool with its own consent and audit — not in the software running unattended everywhere.
  • Agent auto-updateA bad update would land on every machine at once.
  • Log collectionEnormous, expensive, and full of your customers’ business.
  • SNMP polling of switchesSNMP polls in, which is the one thing this design exists to avoid.
  • Application monitoring and ticketingDifferent jobs, done well by other tools.

Suggest an improvement

Tell us what it should do next.

Ideas go straight to the engineers who build it and are read by a person, not a form queue. There is no product committee here — if a suggestion is good and small, it often ships in the next version.

Send what you were trying to do and what got in the way, rather than a feature name; the underlying problem is usually more useful than the proposed solution. You will get an answer either way, including a plain no with the reason.

Some answers are permanent, and it is fairer to say so up front: anything that requires the agent to accept instructions, or the hub to connect into a monitored network, will be declined however it is framed. Those two lines are the product.

contact@redkite.info

Put “improvement suggestion” in the subject and it goes to the technical side for review rather than into the sales pile.

  • Read by the people who write the code
  • Answered, including when the answer is no
  • Shipped improvements reach every licence holder

Questions people actually ask

Before you ask us.

Is this an RMM? Can I use it to fix machines remotely?

No, and deliberately not. An RMM exists to reach into machines and change them; Red Kite exists to notice when one stops talking. The two goals need opposite security postures, and combining them is how a monitoring agent becomes the most dangerous software on a customer’s network.

It sits happily alongside an RMM. Plenty of firms run both — and Red Kite keeps working on the day the RMM’s own agent stops checking in.

Is there really no subscription?

Really. £129, paid once. You install the software on your own server and it is yours. There is no renewal date, no account with us and no licence server to phone. If we vanished tomorrow your hub would carry on watching your machines, because nothing in the running system depends on us being there.

The only ongoing cost is hosting, and that goes to whoever rents you the server — roughly £6 to £20 a month all in, whether you are watching five machines or five hundred.

What happens after the twelve months of updates?

Nothing happens. That is the point of a perpetual licence. The version you are running keeps running — it does not expire, degrade, nag, or stop watching your machines. There is no licence check to fail, because there is no licence check.

What ends is the flow of new versions. If you want another year of them, that is an optional renewal you can take or leave, and taking it later is fine too. Plenty of people will buy this, install it, and never think about it again, which is exactly the relationship a dead man’s switch should have with its owner.

Another twelve months of updates is £69, and you can take it or leave it, this year or in three years’ time. It is deliberately not the sort of number that makes the decision for you — if a version is doing its job, the honest advice is to leave it alone.

How do we actually pay for it?

Write to contact@redkite.info and we will raise an invoice. Tell us the name and address the invoice should go to, and roughly how many machines you expect to watch — the second part does not change the price, it just helps us tell you anything useful before you commit.

There is no card wall and no checkout to get through. This is a licence bought from a small firm in Kettering, and an invoice is how firms here pay each other.

What does it cost per machine or per engineer?

Nothing. The £129 is the whole of it. There is no per-agent fee, no per-endpoint fee, no per-technician licence and no sensors to count. Adding a machine is issuing it a token, and that is free for ever.

This matters more than it sounds. Per-device pricing quietly teaches people to leave the cheap machines unwatched — and the forgotten NAS in the corner is very often the one that dies.

Should I put the hub in the cloud or in my own server room?

The cloud, almost always — and by “cloud” we only mean “somewhere that is not your building”. A hub in your own server room shares the power, the broadband and the roof with the machines it is watching, so the outage you most need to hear about is the one that takes the monitor down too.

There is a second reason. Agents have to reach the hub, so the hub is reachable from the internet. Running it internally means publishing a service from inside your own perimeter; running it on a small server elsewhere keeps that exposure off your network entirely, and the machine holds figures rather than a route back into any of your sites.

Your own server room is supported and sometimes necessary. It is a much better fit for watching machines at other sites than the ones standing next to it.

How quickly will I know?

The default is a check-in every five minutes with a fifteen-minute grace period, so an incident opens roughly twenty minutes after a machine goes quiet and the message leaves within the minute after that. Both figures are per machine: a critical server can be tighter, a laptop that sleeps can be much looser.

The grace period exists because networks hiccup and laptops sleep. A monitor that cries wolf at every dropped packet is one people mute, and a muted monitor is worth nothing.

What do you actually collect about my machines?

Figures, never content. Byte totals, counters, up/down states, and how many of something there were. No file names, no user names, no process command lines, no log message text, no drive serial numbers and no traffic figures.

The published payload above is the whole of it, and anything new is judged by one question before it is added: if this database leaked, what would the customer mind?

What happens if my machine’s clock is wrong?

Nothing breaks. The hub timestamps every check-in on its own clock, so a machine forty minutes out is still monitored correctly. Its clock travels as a fact, and we tell you about the drift — “this machine’s clock is 41 minutes behind ours, so its own timings may look odd” — because drift breaks certificate validation, log correlation and domain sign-in, in that order, weeks before anybody notices.

Do I need to open anything on the firewall?

No. One outbound HTTPS connection on port 443, which every site already permits. No inbound rule, no port forward, no VPN, no static IP. It works behind NAT, behind CG-NAT, and through a corporate proxy.

What if the hub itself goes down?

Three things, all running at once: a daily digest whose absence tells you something is wrong; an external dead man’s switch run by a third party who emails you if your hub stops pinging it; and the hub monitoring itself as an ordinary machine on the same screen as yours.

The external ping is deliberately withheld whenever the sweep is not genuinely running — a hub that is up but not sweeping is the failure that actually matters, and it would otherwise look perfectly healthy.

Can my customers see their own machines?

Not yet, and we would rather be straight about it. The foundation is in from the first migration — every query is already filtered by the set of customers the caller may see, with staff holding a flag meaning “all” — because tenancy retro-fitted is a rewrite and designed in from the start costs nothing.

What has not been built is the customer-facing screens and per-customer alert routing. That work is in progress; see what we are building.

Where is the data held?

Wherever you put it. You run the hub, so the database is yours — a standard PostgreSQL database on your own server, which you back up and can read, export or take elsewhere at any time. We hold no copy of it and have no access to it.

If UK or EU residency matters to you, that is settled by where you rent the server, and it is entirely your choice. Nothing about Red Kite requires the data to leave the country it is created in.

Contact us

Tell us what you need to watch.

One server in a cupboard or eighty across a customer base — either is a short conversation. We will tell you honestly if it is not the right tool for you. To buy a licence, say so and we will raise an invoice.

contact@redkite.info

Red Kite is built by Easy2pc Ltd — IT and network installation, Kettering, Northamptonshire — who run it on their own servers and their customers’.

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